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Abstract
This paper investigates the extent to which Australian CEOs are compensated following the
completion of mergers and acquisitions (M&A)with reference to the incentive alignment and
managerial power perspective. Findings reveal that CEOs of acquiring firms receive signifi-
cantly higher compensation in the year of completing M&As and one year after. This higher
compensation is presented in all forms: bonus only, salary only, salary and bonus, and total
compensation. It is also found that the incentive alignment and managerial power approach
are not mutually exclusive and they both can have some degrees of explaining the variation
of CEO compensation following mergers. We find a positive correlation between CEO com-
pensation and firm performance, and some measures of CEO’s effort and skill in completing
the deal. However, we observe that CEOs of bidding firms have significantly lower bonus and
total compensation if there is any entrenchment in the CEO governance process (i.e. CEO is
also a chair of the board, or a member of the nominating committee). This result is sharply
opposite to the US evidence (Gristein and Hribar (2004)) where CEO compensation after
mergers is significantly driven by CEO power. Overall our findings are more consistent with
the predictions of the incentive alignment theory rather than the managerial power theory.
Keywords: Mergers and acquisitions; CEO compensation; Managerial power; Incentive align-
ment; Firm performance.
JEL classification: G34, J33
1 Introduction
In May 2005, Macquarie Bank Ltd unveiled a record annual profit for the financial year ending
31st March 2005 with after-tax profit from ordinary activities being $852 million, up from $521
million the previous financial year, representing an increase of 64%.1 However, the attention of
media and politicians2 was not on its soaring profit, but on its lucrative remuneration packages
to executives. The bank’s CEO, Allan Moss, received total remuneration of $18.6 million during
2004-2005 financial year with cash bonus of $12.3 million, up from his total remuneration of
$12.3 million and bonus of $8.1 million in the previous financial year. It was also noted that
Macquarie completed several acquisitions during the 2004-2005 financial year.3 Previous US
and UK literature show that acquiring firms make once-off bonus payments to their CEOs for
M&A completion (Gristein and Hribar (2004), Coakley and Iliopoulou (2006)). This has thus
prompted our interest about the extent to which mergers and acquisitions (M&As) can influence
CEO remuneration in the Australian context.
There are two different views on CEO compensation. The traditional view (or incentive align-
ment) claims that CEOs should be rewarded for their skill, effort and company performance, and
the executive compensation package should be designed in a way to align managers’ interests
with those of shareholders (e.g. Jensen and Meckling (1976), Haugen and Senbet (1981)). In
contrast, the managerial power approach (or rent extraction) argues that executives can use their
power to influence their compensation arrangements and to extract rent (e.g. Core et al. (1999),
Bebchuk et al. (2002)). A study in the US market by Gristein and Hribar (2004) generally
concludes that the increased bonus after acquisition is driven more by CEO power, and less by
the effort in completing the bid, or the maximisation of shareholder wealth. Therefore, our main
research question is to explore whether their findings are also replicated in Australia, given Aus-
tralia is a smaller capital market and has different corporate governance arrangements to the US.
The main contributions of this study to the existing Australian literature are three-fold. To our
best knowledge, this paper is the first Australian work examining executive compensation of
1Macquarie Bank Ltd 2005 Financial Report.
2Treasurer Peter Costello criticized into the sheer size of the bank’s pay packages and said it was “beyond
comprehensive for most people”, and “I cannot understand how one person can be worth $18 million” (“Fed:
Govt/Labour rounds on Macquarie payouts”, AAP General News Wire, 18th May 2005).
3For example, significant acquisitions that Macquarie undertook over the financial year 2004-2005 was to buy
92 radio stations in 45 Australian regional markets, and to form Macquirie Goodman Manangement (MGQ),
Australian’s largest industrial property group, from a merger between Macquarie Goodman Industrial Trust
and Macquarie Goddman Management Limited (Macquarie Bank Limited 2005 Annual Review). It also made
acquisitions to other ASX-listed companies such as RG Capital Radio Ltd (100%) and RP Data Ltd (50%)
(Source: SDC database).
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acquiring firms after the completion of M&As. Although past research on executive compensa-
tion in Australia has investigated the relationship between executive pay, labour demand and
corporate governance (e.g. Fleming and Stellios (2002), Chalmers et al. (2006)), their focus is
mainly on all ASX-listed firms. Given M&As is one of the most significant investment decisions
that CEOs make, it is worthwhile to study the practice of remunerating CEOs in a subset of
acquiring firms. Secondly, the Federal Government’s Corporate Law and Economic Reform Pro-
gram (CLERP), Paper No.3 states that corporate governance practices by Australian companies
should be continuously monitored by the Australian Stock Exchange and relevant industries and
professional bodies. Our research will thus contribute towards this monitoring. The third con-
tribution of this paper is that we perform our analysis with an uniquely hand-collected dataset,
spanning over 8 years from 2000 to 2007.4 Although Section 300A(1) of the Corporations Act
has enhanced the CEO compensation disclosure regime from 1st July 1998, the existence of an
electronic database on remuneration and corporate governance data in Australia is very limited.5
We start our analysis by examining the effect of M&As on CEO compensation over the whole
Boardroom Connect4 database over the period 2000 to 2007 with 4,002 firm-year observations.
Our results suggest that CEO compensation is significantly increased in the year of M&A com-
pletion and even one year after. This finding is upheld for all types of CEO compensation
(bonus only, salary only, salary and bonus, and total compensation). We then select a sample of
204 M&A deals between ASX-listed firms that are completed during the financial years 2000 to
2007, to investigate the extent to which theories (traditional or managerial power) can explain
the most variation in CEO compensation. We find that the traditional view and managerial
approach are not mutually exclusive and they both have some impact on CEO compensation
following merger completion. It is observed that board size is a dominant factor in setting
CEO pay, suggesting that bigger boards pay higher CEO compensation in the year of M&A
completion. While the finding of board size is consistent with the rent extraction hypothesis,
the negative relationship between measures of managerial power (CEO Chair and CEO Nomi-
nating) and CEO compensation is opposite to its predictions. In fact, CEO bonuses and total
compensation are significantly lower if there is any entrenchment of the CEO in the governance
process (e.g. CEO is also chair of the board, or is a member of the nominating committee). This
4This is the longest examining period in any Australian study on executive compensation so far. For example,
Izan et al. (1998)’s study consists of 6 years from 1987 to 1992, Chalmers et al. (2006) use 4 years from 1999 to
2002, others (e.g. Coulton and Taylor (2002), Fleming and Stellios (2002)) adopt only single-year analyses.
5Boardroom Connect4 database has remuneration data since 2000, however, in some years, particularly 2003,
there is a lot of missing observations; the name of companies and executives are there but without remuneration
figures. Therefore, we have to manually extract their detailed pay data from annual reports. In addition, corporate
governance data of each acquiring firm are also hand collected from company annual reports.
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result is in sharp contrast to the US evidence (Gristein and Hribar (2004)) where CEO power
is a significant driver of CEO post-bid compensation.
With the exception of the cumulative return around the announcement date, we find more evi-
dence that supports the traditional view. It is found that CEO compensation in acquiring firms
is largely affected by accounting performance (ROA) and stock market performance (TSR). In
addition, CEOs receive more cash bonuses if the deal is completed rather than being withdrawn,
and the size of the deal significantly determines CEO salary and total compensation. Overall,
our findings offer more support for the incentive alignment rather than the managerial approach
approach with respect to CEO compensation following mergers.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the
link between M&As and executive compensation, and provides hypotheses for the study. The
regression models and variables are discussed in Section 3, while Section 4 illustrates the data
sampling process. The empirical results are presented and discussed in Section 5. Finally, Sec-
tion 6 provides some concluding remarks to the study.
2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
There are two competing views on the link between M&As and CEO compensation. The tradi-
tional view, the incentive alignment perspective (or agency theory), argues that the board should
offer the CEO a compensation package that maximises shareholder value (Jensen and Meckling
(1976), Haugen and Senbet (1981)). Such compensation would discourage CEOs entering into
value-destroying deals as argued in Jensen (1986)’s free cash flow theory of takeovers. The
incentive alignment theory assumes that optimal compensation packages can mitigate agency
problems (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). It also acknowledges that CEO compensation is a
function of supply and demand for the CEO’s skills, effort and performance. Opposing the
traditional view is the managerial power approach (or rent extraction theory). As defined by
Finkelstein (1992), managerial power is the ability of managers to influence or exert their will
on the remuneration decisions made by the board of directors. Under this approach, managerial
power creates the ability for management to obtain compensation packages that are sub-optimal
and consequently reduce shareholder wealth (Core et al. (1999), Bebchuk et al. (2002)).
There is evidence in the literature that the traditional view is subject to the moral hazard
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problem. For example, Mirrlees (1976) and Grossman and Hart (1983) show that CEOs do not
necessarily maximise shareholder wealth as their actions are unobservable to investors and they
have incentives to maximise their personal benefits. Therefore, the board needs to design such
a compensation package that aligns CEO incentives with observable measures that maximise
value such as company stock returns or profitability ratios. McConnell and Servaes (1990) find
empirical support for the relationship between executive remuneration and firm value (as mea-
sured by Tobin’s q ratio). Australian studies find mixed results about the relationship between
CEO compensation and firm performance. Previous research (e.g. Izan et al. (1998), Fleming
and Stellios (2002)) find that CEO pay is not linked in any clear way to corporate performance,
while a recent paper (Chalmers et al. (2006)) documents a positive pay-for-performance link.
Although executive compensation is set against a list of market factors, these factors are not
strong enough to compel optimal contracting outcomes, and executives can still use their power
to influence their compensation arrangements and to extract rents (Bebchuk and Fried (2003)).
As argued in Bebchuk et al. (2002), a zero level of rent extraction is unlikely due to monitoring
and incentives aligning devices being very costly. Bebchuk and Fried (2004), hence, contend that
the managerial power hypothesis provides a more satisfying explanation of executive remunera-
tion arrangements than the traditional view of optimal contracting. Under the managerial power
approach, executive compensation will be higher for managers in corporations where managers
have relatively more power.
The literature on executive compensation has further shown that CEOs in companies with
weaker corporate governance often receive greater compensation than those in companies with
stronger corporate governance (e.g. Core et al. (1999), Zhao and Lehn (2006)). There are a
number of internal control mechanisms that can affect the CEO compensation level. Firstly,
the entrenchment of the CEO in the governance process (e.g. the CEO is also chair of the
board, or is a member of the nominating committee). Combining the dual role of CEO and
chairman is equivalent to asking the CEO to self-evaluate, compromising the independence of
the board. A separation of the two roles allows the board to exercise its control function more
effectively (Jensen (1993)) and the separation is commonly associated with reduced managerial
power (Brickley et al. (1997), Conyon and Peck (1998). However, Chalmers et al. (2006) do not
find that the dual role of CEO and chairman is a significant effect on Australian CEO com-
pensation. Contrary to the US evidence, they observe that CEO pay is lower when the CEO
is also the chairman of the board, and this negative relationship is statistically significant in
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the case of shares-issued compensation. Besides duality, it is argued that the CEO presence on
the nomination committee can also increase their ability to extract rents. Main et al. (1995)
observe that the CEO has traditionally dominated the nomination process and they can have a
greater ability to exert influence on the board than if the process is independent of the CEO.
Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) document evidence on the ability of CEOs to affect the selection
of directors. Core et al. (1999) report that the greater the level of power the CEO has over the
selection of board members, the higher the level of compensation they receive.
Secondly, previous research has also found that independent directors act as monitors on behalf
of shareholders, thus the ability of the CEO to exert influence over the board is positively re-
lated to the proportion of executive directors on the board. For instance, Rosenstein and Wyatt
(1990) find that outside director appointments are related to significant positive share price
reactions. Their results suggest that outsider-dominated boards, on average, improve company
value by replacing ineffective management. Hallock (1997) reports that the existence of inter-
locking boards increases CEO pay, and more board diversity reduces CEO pay. Conyon and
Peck (1998) conclude that top management pay and corporate performance are more aligned in
companies with outsider-dominated boards. Paul (2005) documents that board independence
reduces the likelihood of completing value-decreasing bids.
Finally, the size of the board of directors can significantly influence CEO pay. It is often believed
that larger boards are less effective (Jensen (1993)). Yermack (1996) provides evidence that firm
value and performance are a decreasing function of board size. Core et al. (1999) find that CEO
is able to extract greater rents when corporate governance is weak, i.e. bigger board size. An
Australian study by Chalmers et al. (2006) also documents similar findings in relation to the
size of the board of directors. However, in contrast to US evidence (Core et al. (1999)) where
rent extraction through CEO compensation is pervasive, economically significant and persistent,
Chalmers et al. (2006) find that Australian CEOs are able to extract rent only from bonus and
options compensation and the rent extraction does not persist beyond one year.
The literature on executive compensation following M&As shows that CEOs of acquiring firms
are, on average, rewarded with higher compensation for completing mergers. Most studies in the
US and the UK give evidence in support of managerial power rather than value creation driving
the payment of M&A bonuses. For example, when examining the impact of M&As on the remu-
neration of CEOs, both Gristein and Hribar (2004) and Coakley and Iliopoulou (2006) find that
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more powerful CEOs receive significantly larger post-acquisition bonuses. Datta et al. (2001) find
a positive relationship between equity-based compensation of executives and company stock price
performance following acquisitions. Girma et al. (2006) also notice that executive compensation
is higher following mergers. Using the effect on returns around takeover announcement date
as the benchmark, they document that CEOs of companies making value-enhancing acquisition
receive significantly bigger cash pay than their counterparts with wealth-reducing acquisitions.
Harford and Li (2007) show a detachment between CEO pay and company performance after ac-
quisitions; CEOs of bidding firms are still better off despite the fact their shareholders are worse
off. Malmendier and Tate (2008) observe that overconfident CEOs are more likely to overpay for
target companies and undertake value-destroying mergers. In a recent UK study, Guest (2009)
finds that CEOs are rewarded equally for bad and good acquisitions, and the acquiring firms’
strength of corporate governance does not have a significant impact on CEO post-acquisition
compensation.
Given these two different views of managerial compensation, the objective of this paper is to
examine the extent to which managerial power and incentive alignment hypotheses are observed
in the Australian market in the context of CEO compensation in the post-acquisition period. In
particular, three research questions are addressed in this paper. Firstly, is CEO compensation
affected by M&A completion? Secondly, to what extent is CEO compensation received after the
acquisition tied to value maximisation and CEO effort in completing the deal? Thirdly, does
CEO power influence their compensation received following takeovers? It is expected that CEO
compensation is higher following a successful M&A completion, compared to CEO compensation
prior to M&A. Under the incentive alignment approach, there should be a positive relationship
between the level of CEO compensation in acquiring firms and their skill, effort in completing
the deal and the firm performance. On the contrary, the managerial power theory predicts that
CEO bonuses and remuneration are positively related to the level of managerial power in the firm.
3 Methodology
3.1 The relationship between CEO compensation and M&As
We first address the question of whether compensation and bonuses paid to CEOs are actually
related to M&A decisions. Following Gristein and Hribar (2004) and Coakley and Iliopoulou
(2006), we estimate the following regression over the whole Boardroom Connect4 database in
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the period from 2000 to 2007 (the control sample).
Compensationit = α+ β1Sizei(t−1) + β2ROAit + β3ROAGrowthit + β4TSRit (1)
+β5SalesGrowthit + β6Marginit + β7MarginGrowthit
+β8AcquisitionDummyit + β9AcquisitionDummyi(t−1)
+[Y earDummies] + [IndustryDummies] + it
The dependent variable in equation (1) is the compensation paid to CEOs of acquiring firm i
at the end of year when merger is completed. We examine four types of compensation: bonus
only, salary only, salary and bonus, and total compensation. Following the previous literature,
the independent variables of equation (1) include:
• firm size measured as total book value of assets one year prior to the merger (Size).
• firm performance variables in the year of merger completion (ROA, ROA Growth, TSR,
Sales Growth, Margin, Margin Growth).6.
• AcqusitionDummyt and AcqusitionDummyt−1 are binary variables set to equal 1 if the
firm completed an acquisition during the year and one year before, respectively. If firms
compensate their CEOs for acquisitions, the coefficients on both AcqusitionDummyt and
AcqusitionDummyt−1 variables will be significantly positive.
• industry-specific7 and year-specific fixed effects to control for differences in compensation
across industries and over time.
In their OLS regression analyses, both Gristein and Hribar (2004) and Coakley and Iliopoulou
(2006) measure compensation figures in thousand of dollars and size in million of dollars. Since
we have zero observations in some types of executive compensation, tobit regression is also
performed in order to censor for these zero observations because OLS regression might suffer
from mis-specification. Therefore, for the first three types of compensation (bonus only, salary
only, salary and bonus), we analyse equation (1) using both OLS and tobit regressions with
compensation and size variables are in dollars. For total compensation, since there are no zero
observations, we use only OLS regression but size and compensation variables are expressed in
both dollar value and natural logarithm figures.
6Description of each variable is in Table 1 in the Data section.
7Firms are sorted according to their 2-digit codes of Global Industry Classification System (GICS).
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3.2 The influence of CEOs on their compensation received post-acquisition
Our second and third research question are to examine the extent to which CEO effort, skill,
performance and power can determine their level of compensation in the post-acquisition period.
Therefore, the regression model of the sample of firms undertaking M&As is estimated as follows
(the treatment sample):
Compensationi = χ+ δ1Sizei + δ2DealSizei + δ3CompletionT imei + δ4Diversifyi (2)
+δ5DealResulti + δ6CAR[−1 ,+1 ]i + δ7OfferPriceRevisioni + δ8ROAi
+δ9TSRi + δ10CEOChairi + δ11CEONominatingi + δ12InsiderRatioi
+δ13BoardSizei + [Y earDummies] + [IndustryDummies] + i
According to the traditional view, CEOs will be rewarded more if the deals require them to
exert more effort and skill. The first set of variables in equation (2) is intended to measure
managers’ skill and effort exerted in M&As. They include size of the deal (Deal Size), the time
it takes to complete the deal (Completion Time), a proxy for diversified acquisitions (Diversify),
the result of the deal (a dummy variable that equals to one if the deal is completed, not with-
drawn), two-day abnormal returns (adjusted against the All Ordinaries Index) surrounding the
announcement of the deal (CAR[-1,1]) to capture the market’s reaction to the managerial deci-
sion, and a variable to indicate whether the final offer price has been revised from the original
bid price (Offer Price Revision). Larger deals are more complex and require more effort and
skill from managers, and similarly completed deals would require more managerial effort than
withdrawn deals. Deals with a revision in offer price would demand more effort from CEOs of
bidding firms than those without an offer price revision. It is also assumed that a longer the
time to complete the deal is an indication that the CEO needed to exert additional effort. An
acquisition of a company from a different industry would require less effort because of fewer in-
tegration problems between target and acquirer. Finally, a higher market’s reaction to the deal
announcement indicates that the acquisition is viewed positively by investors. Therefore, under
the traditional approach, it would be expected that Deal Size, Completion Time, Deal Result,
CAR[-1,1] and Offer Price Revision variables are all positively related to CEO compensation,
while a negative relationship should exist between Diversify and CEO compensation.
The second set of variables in equation (2) is to measure company performance since it may be
difficult for remuneration committees to quantify exactly the CEOs’ effort and skill in takeover
completion (Gristein and Hribar (2004)). We use return on assets (ROA) and stock return of
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the firm in the financial year (TSR). It is expected that these accounting and stock market per-
formance variables are positively related to the level of CEO compensation under the traditional
view.
The third set of variables in equation (2) intends to capture managerial power and corporate
governance of acquiring firms since Gristein and Hribar (2004) and Coakley and Iliopoulou
(2006) find that CEO compensation is positively related to managerial power. Following the
previous literature, we adopt a number of measures such as CEO Chair (a dummy variable that
equals to one when the CEO also holds the position as chairman of the board of directors);
CEO Nominating (a binary variable equal to one if the CEO is also a member of the nominating
committee); Insider Ratio (the ratio of the number of executive directors on the board to total
directors); and Board Size (the number of directors on the board). Under the managerial power
approach, there should be a positive correlation between the level of managerial power in the
firm and the level of executive compensation. In other words, the coefficients of all managerial
power variables in equation (2) should be positive.
This paper also controls for8 industry, time fixed effects and size due to the impact of increasing
bonuses over time and differences in company size and compensation across industries. For
example, Murphy (1999) has found that CEOs in electric utilities earn significant lower levels
of compensation than their counterparts in other industries, while CEOs in financial services
companies earn higher pay. Also, managers may demand greater compensation for controlling
organisations of greater corporate complexity, and because their own talents are relatively scare
in some industries and market periods (Agarwal (1981)).
In our treatment sample, only the bonus component has zero observations. Therefore, bonus
is analysed by using both the OLS and tobit regressions with dollar value for bonus, company
8In Gristein and Hribar (2004), the Heckman correction variable (Heckman (1979)) is calculated and included
in the regression (2) in order to overcome the potential selection bias since acquiring firms are not randomly
chosen from the population of firms. Following Gristein and Hribar (2004), we run a probit regression over the
Boardroom Connect4 firms (total of 3,172 firms) over the period 2000 to 2007 for modelling the probability that
a firm will undertake an acquisition. The explanatory variables in the probit regression are pre-merger market-to-
book (M/B) ratio, cash to assets, debt to assets, ROA, operating revenue (log), and a dummy variable indicating
whether the firm acquired another firm in the previous year. Industry-specific and year-specific fixed effects are
also included. Significant variables at the 10% level from the probit regression consist of cash to assets, ROA,
operating revenue and the acquisition dummy in the previous year. The estimates from the probit regression
are used to construct the Heckman variable and then added into the regression (2). However, it is found in our
sample that the Heckman variable, which is represented as the probability of firm undertaking an acquisition, is
highly correlated with other variables in the regression (2). For example, its correlation coefficient is 0.39 with
Size, 0.28 with Deal Size, 0.24 with ROA, -0.3 with Insider Ratio and 0.55 with Board Size. Therefore, we exclude
the Heckman correction variable from the regression (2) due to the potential problem of multicollinearity.
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size and deal size variables (same measure as in Gristein and Hribar (2004)). For other types
of compensation (i.e. salary only, salary and bonus, and total compensation), only the OLS
regression is adopted and both dollar value and natural logarithm figures are used to measure
the executive compensation, company size and deal size.
4 Data
4.1 Sample
Data on mergers and acquisitions are extracted from the SDC database. We only consider public
companies (because of data availability) that have M&A deals finalised during their financial
years between 2000 and 2007. Deal-related information is obtained from SDC database, share
prices are collected from the SIRCA Core Research Database, and other relevant accounting
data come from Aspect FinAnalysis. CEO compensation data for each acquiring firm CEO
are extracted from the Boardroom Connect4 database and their annual reports for the earlier
years. Companies’ annual financial reports are also manually checked for each acquiring firm’s
governance characteristics. The final treatment sample contains 204 M&A deals. A definition
of each variable together with its data source is presented in Table 1.
[Insert Table 1]
Our analysis also requires a control sample of firms (for the purpose of addressing research ques-
tion one). We pick these firms on the basis that they must be publicly listed companies and
must not have been involved in a merger and acquisition in the current financial year. Likewise,
we also require remuneration, balance sheet and returns data for these firms; leaving a control
sample of 4,002 observations.9
4.2 Descriptive statistics of the treatment sample
Table 2 presents summary statistics of acquiring firms in our treatment sample.10 Panel A of
Table 2 shows the financial characteristics of firms one year before merger completion. Acquiring
firms are, on average, quite large, approximately $6.7 billion in total book assets and $2.4 billion
in market capitalisation. Smaller median figures ($314 million and $398 million, respectively)
together with high standard deviation ($35 billion and $6.9 billion, respectively) indicate that
the distribution of firm size and market capitalisation are highly skewed. Acquiring firms in our
9The treatment sample of 204 observations is a subset in this control sample.
10We do not present the summary statistics for the control sample.
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sample perform quite well with average return on assets of 6.32% and average stock return of
14%.
[Insert Table 2]
Panel B of Table 2 describes the deal characteristics of firms in our treatment sample. The
average deal size is around $320 million, while the median figure is approximately $45 million.
It takes an average of 107 days from the date of deal announcement to complete, and only less
than 75% of the firms complete the deal in 4 months (125 days). The majority of firms acquire
other companies with the same 2-digit GICS industry code, only 19% of firms in our sample buy
firms from different industries. The market reacts quite positively to the M&A announcement,
with 50% of the firms having positive cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of above 0.52% over
three event windows: one day before the announcement [-1,0] , two days surrounding the an-
nouncement [-1,1], and four days centred on the announcement date [-2,2]. In our sample, 37%
of the deals have an offer price revision after the announcement of the initial offer, and 77% of
the deals are completed.
Corporate governance characteristics of acquiring firms in the year of M&A completion are pre-
sented in Panel C of Table 2. In our sample, about 7.4% of the firms have CEOs who are also
the chairperson of the board. This indicates the dual role of CEOs and chairmen in Australian
companies is significantly lower than the US and UK counterparts, and they reasonably fol-
low the recommendation of the ASX Corporate Governance Council.11 Studies by Gristein and
Hribar (2004) and Coakley and Iliopoulou (2006) reveal that 73% of US CEOs are also chairmen
while this figure is 24% for UK CEOs. In contrast, 69% of Australian CEOs are member of the
nominating committee, the committee that proposes new board members, while this proportion
is 48% in the UK study (Coakley and Iliopoulou (2006)) and 25% in the US study (Gristein and
Hribar (2004)). In addition, the average Australian board size is 7 directors which is smaller
than both the US and the UK markets. The majority of Australian board members are non-
executives, with the average board having approximately 30% of executive directors, which is
similar to the US market.
Table 3 presents summary statistics for the compensation that CEOs received over three separate
one-year periods: the year prior to the merger (pre-merger), the year of the merger completion,
11In 2003, the ASX Corporate Governance Council has published “Principles of good corporate governance and
best practice recommendations” to ASX-listed companies. The Council has suggested in Recommendation 2.3
that “the roles of chairperson and CEO should not be exercised by the same individual”.
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and one year after the merger is completed (post-merger). Figures are shown separately for four
types of compensation: bonus, salary, salary and bonus, and total compensation. Compared
with the year before a merger, Australian CEOs enjoy increases in their median bonus pay of
$38,000 in the acquisition completion year and of $47,000 in the post-merger year. However, not
all companies award cash bonuses to their CEOs for M&A decisions, just over 25% of acquiring
firms in our sample do not pay any bonus at all. The increase in pay following the completion
of the deal is also observed in other forms of compensation. CEOs also benefit from additional
salary of $78,000 immediately following the deal being completed and $162,000 in one year after
that. Similar figures for extra total compensation are $120,000 and $310,000, respectively.
[Insert Table 3]
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Is CEO compensation higher following M&As?
This section reports the results of tests relating to research question one: to examine the extent
to which CEOs of acquiring firms are awarded higher compensation after completing M&As.
The model is estimated using equation (1) over the entire Boardroom Connect4 database for the
period 2000-2007. The results are presented in Table 4 for four different types of compensation:
bonus only, salary only, salary and bonus, and total compensation.
[Insert Table 4]
We first replicate Gristein and Hribar (2004)’s study by using OLS technique with size and
compensation variables expressed in dollar value. The results are presented in Column (1), (3),
(5) and (7) of Table 4. Consistent with the previous studies in the US and UK markets, the
coefficients on both Acquisition dummies are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level.
These results suggest that after controlling for size, acquiring firms not only pay higher CEO
bonuses but also higher salary and total compensation for acquisitions in the year of completing
the merger and one year after. Our results are slightly different to Gristein and Hribar (2004)’s
findings in the US market in which they observe that the remuneration committees reward
CEOs of acquiring firms mainly through bonuses. Similar to the prior Australian literature on
CEO compensation, we also find significant positive effects on compensation for company size,
return on assets and company stock return (e.g. Izan et al. (1998), Fleming and Stellios (2002),
Chalmers et al. (2006)).
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We further extend Gristein and Hribar (2004)’s method by using a tobit regression for the first
three types of compensation (bonus only, salary only, salary and bonus) since they contain ob-
servations with zero values. The results are very similar to the OLS results and are shown in
Column (2), (4) and (6) of Table 4. It is evident that both Acquisition variables have positive
and significant coefficients with larger coefficients when adopting the tobit regression.
For total compensation, we adopt the OLS technique only (since all observations are non-zero)
and use two measures for the size and compensation variables: dollar value (same measure-
ment as Gristein and Hribar (2004)) and natural logarithm. The results in Column (7) and (8)
of Table 4 show that the coefficients on the Acquisition variables are indeed significantly positive.
In short, our analyses indicate that CEOs of acquiring firms are awarded higher bonuses and
compensation for the completion of M&As after controlling for company performance, company
size and fixed effects. The next section will investigate which factors determine CEO compen-
sation in the post-acquisition period.
5.2 Determinants of CEO post-acquisition compensation
This section investigates the second and third research questions: the extent to which the in-
centive alignment approach and the managerial power approach can explain the level of CEO
compensation received after mergers. We first examine CEO bonuses by performing both OLS
and tobit regressions12 and the results are presented in Table 5 and Table 6, respectively. There
are multiple specifications in each table: we consider only the set of variables that measure
managerial skill and effort in completing the deal in the first specification (Column (1)). The
second specification (Column (2)) uses variables that measure company accounting and stock
market performance. The third specification (Column (3)) combines all variables measuring
CEO effort, skill and firm performance, while the forth specification (Column (4)) only takes
into account managerial power variables. In the last specification (Column (5)), we combine all
variables in one equation to examine the relative effects of the two theories on CEO pay. All
the regressions control for company size, year-specific and industry-specific fixed effects.
[Insert Table 5 and 6]
Table 5 and Table 6 show very similar results. The coefficient of the Size variable is signif-
12As mentioned in the Methodology section, OLS regression may suffer from mis-specification when the bonus
variable is truncated at zero. Therefore, we place more weight on the results of tobit regresion.
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icantly positive across all specifications, suggesting that larger acquiring companies are more
complex to manage and tend to pay higher bonuses to their CEOs. This positive association is
consistent with previous Australian research on executive compensation (e.g. Izan et al. (1998),
Fleming and Stellios (2002), Chalmers et al. (2006)). The Deal Result and Offer Price Revision
variables are significantly positive in the tobit regression, indicating that managers are actu-
ally compensated for their effort in completing takeover deals. However, there is a significantly
negative relationship between the two-day market-adjusted returns surrounding the announce-
ment (CAR[-1,1]) and CEO bonuses. The CAR[-1,1] variable reflects the market’s perception
on the quality of the acquisition decision, therefore, this contradicts with the traditional view.
These findings further suggest that there is mixed evidence supporting the incentive alignment
approach that managerial bonuses received following completion of the deal are linked to man-
agerial effort and skill in the takeover deal.
As mentioned earlier in Section 2, in order to align CEO incentives to shareholders’ benefits,
the board also needs to take into account observable measures of the firm’s profitability in de-
signing the CEO remuneration package. We thus include two variables to measure company
performance, return on assets (ROA) and company annual stock performance (TSR), in the
analysis of CEO bonuses. Both performance variables are insignificant in the OLS regression
(Table 5), while only ROA’s coefficient is significantly positive in the tobit regression (Table 6)
when the zero observations of bonuses are censored. The lack of association between CEO bonus
and market performance is in line with previous empirical research in Australia (Fleming and
Stellios (2002)). The significance of the ROA variable implies that bonuses paid to acquiring
firm CEOs are related to the observable accounting measure of firm performance. This result is
consistent with recent Australian research by Chalmers et al. (2006).13
The coefficient on the Board Size variable is positive and statistically significant at the 5%
level (in the tobit regression). This result indicates that larger boards of directors pay higher
CEO bonuses following takeovers, and possibly reflects monitoring difficulties with bigger boards
(consistent with the rent extraction theory). It supports the findings of previous studies (e.g.
Yermack (1996), Coakley and Iliopoulou (2006), Chalmers et al. (2006)) that smaller boards are
an effective mechanism for internal corporate control. However, in contrast to the predictions of
the managerial power hypothesis, the CEO Chair and CEO Nominating coefficients are negative
13We and Chalmers et al. (2006) both employ return on asset (ROA) as a proxy for firm performance. However,
earlier Australian studies (e.g. O’Neill and Iob (1999), Izan et al. (1998)) use other proxies such as return on equity
and find no evidence to suggest a consistent trend of linking Australian executive pay and company performance.
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in both Table 5 and Table 6, and this negative relationship becomes statistically significant in
the tobit regression (Table 6). These findings suggest that CEO bonuses after mergers are lower
if the CEOs have more power. They are not in line with the US findings (Gristein and Hribar
(2004)) that the increased bonus after acquisition is driven by CEO power.14
To further understand our findings in relation to the CEO Chair variable, we separate the orig-
inal sample into 2 sub-samples: the first contains 15 observations in which the CEO is also the
chairperson, and the second consists of 189 company years with no CEO duality. Descriptive
statistics reveal that the first sub-sample always has lower average (and median) bonuses, and
smaller size (measured as the book value of total assets in one year prior to acquisition) than
that of the second sub-sample. For example, 50% of companies with CEO duality do not pay
bonuses to their CEOs after mergers, while 50% of companies with no dual role of CEO and
chairman give CEO bonuses of more than $100,000; a large proportion (87%) of companies in
the first sub-sample have their total assets being less than 50% of companies in the second
sub-sample. As firm size is positively related to CEO bonuses, it can be argued that those firms
with a separation of CEO-Chairman positions are small firms and therefore their CEO should
receive lower bonuses. To further explore this argument, we rank all firms in our original sample
according to their size (book assets) and perform the analysis with a sample of 141 observations
which contain the 15 companies having CEO duality. The regression result is very similar, CEOs
of acquiring firms receive lower bonuses when they also hold the chairman position, and this
result is robust when firm size is controlled for.15
Moreover, it is found that the negative relationship between bonuses and CEO duality is always
significant when this correlation is examined conditionally on each of the other explanatory
variables. In addition, the negative association between CEO duality (i.e. CEO is also the
chairman) is also present in previous Australian research by Chalmers et al. (2006) when they
examine the determinants of CEO compensation using the top 200 ASX-listed firms over the
period from 1999 to 2002. In our sample of acquiring firms, the proportion of CEOs having a
dual role is very small (approximately 7.4% on average),16 and it seems that the market would
14There are mixed findings in the UK market. In one of the earlier UK studies, Coakley and Iliopoulou (2006)
reach similar conclusions as Gristein and Hribar (2004)’s study that CEO compensation following merger is
driven more by CEO power when examining 73 completed M&A deals for UK bidders over the period 1998-2001.
However, in a recent UK study, Guest (2009) uses a more comprehensive sample of 4,528 acquisitions from 1984 to
2001 and documents no evidence that weak corporate governance can allow CEOs to extract higher rents through
compensation in the post-bid period.
15The results of this analysis is available on request.
16In Chalmers et al. (2006)’s study, this proportion is 8.8%.
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monitor powerful CEOs more closely, and as such bonuses on average are not increased following
deal completion. Similar results are also obtained when we further analyse the CEO Nominating
variable. Our findings, thus, do not support the managerial power approach, suggesting that
the more power CEOs have, the less bonus they receive after acquisition.
In the next part of our analysis, we replace the dependent variable in equation (2) from bonuses
to the other three forms of compensation: salary only, salary and bonus, and total compensation.
In each component, we perform two types of OLS regression.17 The first one is referred to as
$’000 regression in which the compensation figure is in thousands of dollars, deal size and size
variables are in million dollars (same measure as Gristein and Hribar (2004)). The second one
is Log regression in which all compensation, size and deal size variables are expressed in natural
logarithm. The results are presented in Table 7.
[Insert Table 7]
Overall, the results in Table 7 are very similar to that observed in Table 5 and Table 6. Company
size (Size), return on assets (ROA), and the size of the board of directors (Board Size) are signif-
icantly positive across all three types of CEO compensation. CEO Chair and CEO Nominating
variables are also negative and CEO Nominating variable becomes statistically significant under
total compensation category. In addition, more variables that proxy for CEO’s skill, effort and
performance (Deal Size, Diversify, Offer Price Revision, company stock returns (TSR)) become
statistically significant.
In summary, both the traditional view hypothesis and the rent extraction hypothesis do have
certain explanatory power in determining CEO compensation following mergers. The positive
association between the Board Size variable and all forms of CEO compensation does provide
strong support for the argument that managerial power enables the extraction of rents by the
CEO. However, in contrast to the predictions of the managerial power theory, the level of bonuses
and total compensation are negatively related to the other two variables that proxy for manage-
rial power (CEO Chair and CEO Nominating). Consistent with the traditional view, it is found
that CEO compensation is determined by corporate accounting performance (ROA) and stock
market performance (TSR). Total compensation is significantly associated with the higher stock
market performance, while the other three components of CEO pay (bonus only, salary only,
salary and bonus) are largely affected by company accounting profitability. In addition, CEOs
17Since all these types of compensation do not have zero observations, OLS regression is not subject to mis-
specification.
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receive more cash bonuses if the deal is completed rather than being withdrawn, and the size of
the deal is a significant determinant of CEO salary and total compensation. Nevertheless, the
significantly negative coefficient of CAR[-1,1] when analysing the bonus component does not
support for the hypothesis that CEOs are compensated for their effort in the M&A deals. On
the relative balance, it can be concluded that the higher level of Australian CEO bonuses and
compensation after M&As are driven more by CEO’s effort, skill in completing the deal and
corporate performance and less by managerial power.
5.3 Robustness
In our first robustness test, the CAR[-1,1] variable to proxy for the deal performance is re-
placed by other variables to measure market-adjusted returns over various other event windows
surrounding the announcement date: CAR[-1,0], CAR[-2,2] and CAR[-5,5]. Additionally, we
construct a scoring system of measuring CEO power, by taking the sum of the two binary
managerial power variables (CEO Chair and CEO Nominating), which ranges from zero (least
managerial power) to two (largest power). When equation (2) is analysed with the above vari-
ables, similar results are obtained.
If we put further restrictions on the sample of acquiring firms to exclude all multiple deals in
any given year, and to exclude any company which undertakes M&As in the previous year, our
sample size is reduced to 119 company-year observations for the treatment sample, and 2,650
observations for the control sample. We repeat the regressions in equation (1)18 and equation
(2) with the new sample and still get the same results.
6 Conclusion
This paper uses a sample of 204 M&A deals between ASX-listed companies from 2000 to 2007
to investigate the determinants of CEO pay following M&A events. We find a significant associ-
ation between executive compensation and M&A deals, suggesting that acquiring firms reward
their CEOs for the successful completion of M&As. The higher level of CEO pay after mergers
is found in all forms of compensation: bonus only, salary only, salary and bonus, and total com-
pensation. It is also observed that larger firms demand higher quality CEOs and pay for such
18The equation (1) now does not have the variable AcquisitionDummyt−1 since we exclude all companies which
have acquisitions in the previous year. It is found that the coefficient on AcquisitionDummyt variable is still
significantly positive at the 1% level across all types of CEO compensation.
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quality. This paper finds that measures of effort, skill and performance, except for the cumula-
tive return surrounding the announcement date, can explain CEO compensation in the year of
completing acquisitions. In particular, company stock performance (TSR) and accounting per-
formance (ROA) are positively related to CEO compensation; CEOs are awarded higher cash
bonuses for completed rather than withdrawn deals; larger deal size is correlated with higher
CEO salary and total compensation.
With the exception of the Board Size variable, we do not find that the managerial power ap-
proach can explain much of the cross-sectional variation in CEO compensation. In fact, our
empirical results indicate that CEOs of acquiring firms receive significantly lower bonuses and
total compensation when they have more managerial power (i.e. the CEO is also the chair of
the board, or the CEO also holds a seat on the nomination committee). These results are in line
with previous Australian research on CEO compensation of companies listed on the Australian
Stock Exchange (Chalmers et al. (2006)). Our findings, however, are in sharp contrast to the
US market where rent extraction through CEO compensation following M&A deals is economi-
cally significant (Gristein and Hribar (2004)). The reason is probably due to the fact that the
entrenchment of the CEO in corporate governance is more severe in the US market with 73% of
US firms having CEOs being also the chairman of the board (Gristein and Hribar (2004)), while
this figure in Australia is approximately 8%. Overall our results favour the alignment incentive
rather than the managerial power explanation in determining CEO compensation after mergers.
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Table 1: Definition of all dependent and independent variables
Variables Definition Sources
of data
CEO compensation of acquiring firms
Total compensation The sum of salary, director’s fee, bonus, superannuation, Boardroom and
allowances, non-cash, motor, committee fees, consulting fees, annual reports
retire/termination, other, long-term incentive plan (LTIP),
accrued entitlements, stock options and shares
Salary The sum of salary, director’s fees and superannuation Boardroom and
annual reports
Bonus Bonus paid to CEO Boardroom and
annual reports
Salary & Bonus The sum of salary, director’s fee, superannuation and bonus Boardroom and
annual reports
Performance and characteristics of acquiring firms
Size Book value of total assets of acquiring firm prior to the FinAnalysis
merger and acquisition
ROA Earnings before tax divided by total assets FinAnalysis
ROA Growth Current ROA divided by ROA in the previous year FinAnalysis
TSR The raw return of acquiring firm’s shares during the FinAnalysis
financial year of merger completion
Sales Growth Sales in current year divided by sales in the previous year FinAnalysis
Margin Earnings before tax divided by sales FinAnalysis
Margin Growth Margin in the current year divided by margin in the previous year FinAnalysis
Deal characteristics
Deal Size The dollar value of the deal SDC
Completion Time The number of days between the deal announcement SDC
and completion
CAR[-1,1] The two-day market adjusted return (against All Ordinaries CRD
Index) between the day prior to the announcement and
the day after the announcement
Diversify A binary variable coded as one if the 2-digit GICS industry codes FinAnalysis
of acquirer and target firms are different, zero otherwise
Deal Result A binary variable coded as one if the deal is completed, SDC
zero otherwise
Governance characteristics of acquiring firms
CEO Chair A binary variable coded as one if the CEO is also the Annual reports
chairman of the board, zero otherwise
CEO Nominating A binary variable coded as one if the CEO is on the Annual reports
nominating committee, zero otherwise
remuneration committee, zero otherwise
Board Size The number of members on the Board of Directors Annual reports
Insider Ratio The percentage of executive directors on the Board Annual reports
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of acquiring firms
This table presents summary statistics of acquiring firms that completed their takeovers bids during the financial
years from 2000 to 2007. The sample includes 204 deals between companies listed on the Australian Stock
Exchange. Size is the book value of total assets one financial year prior to the merger; Market cap. is the
acquirers’ market value of equity a year before merger; ROA is earnings before tax divided by the book value of
total assets for the year prior to the merger. TSR is the log of stock returns of acquiring firms for the financial
year before the merger. Deal Size is dollar value of the deal. Completion Time is the number of days between
the deal announcement and the day of completion; CAR[-1,0], CAR[-1,1], CAR[-2,2], CAR[-5,5] indicate
market adjusted returns (against the All Ordinaries Index) over the windows centred on the announcement
day; Diversify is a binary variable coded one if the 2-digit GICS industry codes of acquirer and target firms are
different, and zero otherwise. CEO Chair is a binary variable coded one if the CEO is also the chairman of
the board; CEO Nominating is a binary variable coded one if the CEO is on the nominating committee; CEO
Remuneration is a binary variable coded one if the CEO is on the remuneration committee; Board Size is the
number of members on the Board of Directors; Insider Ratio is the percentage of executive directors on the Board.
Standard 1st 3rd
Mean Deviation Quartile Median Quartile
Panel A: Financial characteristics of acquiring firms one year prior to M&A completion
Size ($m) 6,732 35,085 74.94 314.05 2,270
Market cap. ($m) 2,354 6,948 75.56 397.85 2,127
ROA 6.32% 16.59% 1.56% 6.21% 11.41%
TSR 14.00% 55.53% -5.97% 17.69% 39.33%
Panel B: Deal characteristics
Deal Size ($m) 320.04 894.42 12.13 44.64 147.81
Completion Time (days) 107 62 67 94 125
CAR[-1,0] 0.80% 5.99% -1.14% 0.52% 2.56%
CAR[-1,1] 1.18% 6.99% -2.07% 0.88% 3.37%
CAR[-2,2] 0.72% 7.47% -2.57% 0.82% 3.81%
Diversify 18.63%
Completed Deals 76.96%
Offer Price Revision 36.76%
Panel C: Governance characteristics of acquiring firms in M&A completion year
CEO Chair 7.35%
CEO Nominating 69.12%
Board Size 7 2 5 7 8
Insider Ratio 28.29% 15.10% 16.35% 25.00% 40.00%
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Table 3: CEO compensation statistics
This table presents summary statistics of compensation for CEOs of acquiring firms that completed their
takeovers bids during the financial years from 2000 to 2007. The sample includes 204 deals between companies
listed on the Australian Stock Exchange. All compensation figures are in thousand of dollars, and sourced from
the Boardroom Connect4 database or manually collected from companies’ annual reports. pre-merger indicates
compensation figures in the financial year prior to the takeover, merger completion refers to compensation figures
in the financial year when the deal is completed, and post-merger implies compensation figures in the financial
year after the deal completion.
Standard 1st 3rd
Mean Deviation Quartile Median Quartile
Bonus
pre-merger 252 446 0 34 253
merger completion 393 1,269 0 72 363
post-merger 508 1,793 0 81 400
Salary
pre-merger 699 962 247 399 752
merger completion 678 555 298 477 915
post-merger 798 681 340 561 1,015
Salary& Bonus
pre-merger 952 1,231 275 498 1,076
merger completion 1,071 1,482 324 623 1,265
post-merger 1,306 2,104 369 733 1,548
Total compensation
pre-merger 1,349 1,921 322 666 1,523
merger completion 1,541 2,246 385 786 1,965
post-merger 2,012 3,231 439 967 2,046
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Table 4: Regression of CEO compensation against firm performance, size and M&A activity
The sample includes all ASX-listed firms in the Boardroom Connect4 database that have financial information over the
year 2000 and 2007. Size is the book value of total assets one financial year prior to the merger; ROA is earnings before tax
divided by the book value of total assets for the year prior to merger; ROA Growth is measured as current ROA divided
by previous ROA; TSR is the log of stock returns of acquiring firms during the financial year of merger completion; Sales
Growth equals current sales divided by sales in the previous year; Margin is earnings before tax divided by sales; Margin
Growth is current margin divided by margin in the previous year; AcqusitionDummyt and AcqusitionDummyt−1 are
binary variables equal to 1 if the firm completed an acquisition during the year and one year before, respectively. For
regressions (1) through (7), the compensation figure is in thousands of dollars, and size is in millions of dollars (same
measure as Gristein and Hribar (2004)). Regression (8) takes the natural logarithm of total compensation and size. Each
regression uses White heteroskedasticity consistent covariance estimates. It also includes industry-specific and year-specific
fixed effects to control for systematic differences in bonus across industries and over time. Figures in bracket are t-statistics
(or z-statistics in case of tobit regressions). Emboldened figures indicate statistical significance of 10% level or better.
Bonus Salary Salary & Bonus Total compensation
($’000) ($’000) ($’000)
OLS Tobit OLS Tobit OLS Tobit OLS
$’000 Log
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sizet−1 0.007 0.009 0.006 0.006 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.36
[4.94] [5.03] [5.6] [5.61] [6.08] [6.09] [6.28] [60.91]
ROAt 1.09 467.2 2.21 2.24 3.3 3.38 4.23 -0.004
[2.57] [3.02] [2.02] [2.02] [2.34] [2.31] [2.16] [-1.90]
ROAGrowtht -0.05 -0.35 -0.08 -0.08 -0.13 -0.13 -0.22 -0.001
[-1.02] [-0.89] [-1.02] [-0.96] [-1.21] [-1.09] [-1.35] [-2.66]
TSRt 23.45 123.7 7.58 8.38 31.03 32.88 55.51 0.08
[7.06] [3.52] [1.22] [1.31] [2.73] [2.8] [3.00] [4.54]
SalesGrowtht -0.0003 -0.007 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0009 0
[-1.96] [-1.34] [-0.26] [-0.24] [-0.59] [-0.56] [-0.68] [0.99]
Margint 0.002 0.01 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.005 0
[3.02] [0.81] [1.52] [1.49] [2.03] [1.96] [1.45] [-2.22]
MarginGrowtht -0.002 -0.01 -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 -0.009 -0.01 0
[-1.92] [-0.67] [-1.3] [-1.45] [-1.58] [-1.5] [-1.88] [0.001]
AcquisitionDummyt 225.79 505.74 239.94 244.87 465.74 475.23 673.04 0.16
[2.67] [3.71] [6.1] [6.25] [4.74] [4.83] [4.64] [3.40]
AcqusitionDummyt−1 57.6 238.29 114.71 114.7 172.32 172.31 250.41 0.08
[2.66] [5.86] [6.32] [6.26] [5.11] [5.07] [4.46] [2.89]
Include fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(Industry & Year)
Adjusted R2 8.74% 12.50% 13.58% 14.00% 52.87%
No. of zero obs 2,854 79 72
No. of non-zero obs 1,352 4,127 4,134
Total obs 4,206 4,206 4,206 4,206 4,206 4,206 4,206 4,206
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Table 5: Regression of CEO bonus against firm performance, managerial effort, skill and power
- OLS regression
This table presents the results of an OLS regression of CEO bonuses on firm performance, managerial effort, skill and
power. The sample includes all ASX-listed firms in the Boardroom Connect4 database that have financial information
over the year 2000 and 2007. Bonuses are in thousands of dollars and size is in millions of dollars (same measure as
Gristein and Hribar (2004)). Each regression uses White heteroskedasticity consistent covariance estimates. It also includes
industry-specific and year-specific fixed effects to control for systematic differences in bonuses across industries and over
time. Size is the book value of total assets one financial year prior to the merger; Deal Size is the dollar value of the deal;
Completion Time is the log of the number of days between the date of deal announcement and the date of completion;
Diversify is a binary variable coded one if the 2-digit GICS industry codes of acquirer and target firms are different, and
zero otherwise; Deal Result is a binary variable coded one if the deal is completed and zero otherwise; CAR[-1,1] indicates
the market adjusted returns (against the All Ordinaries Index) over the windows centred on the announcement day; ROA
is earnings before tax divided by the book value of total assets; Offer Price Revision is a binary variable coded as one if the
bidder revises the price offered to the target;Return is the log of stock returns of acquiring firms one financial year before
the merger; CEO Chair is a binary variable coded one if the CEO is also the chairman of the board; CEO Nominating is
a binary variable coded as one if the CEO is on the nominating committee; Board Size is the number of members on the
Board of Directors; Insider Ratio is the percentage of executive directors on the Board. Figures in bracket are t-statistics.
Emboldened figures indicate statistical significance of 10% level or better.
Dependent variable: Bonus ($’000) - OLS regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sizet−1 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.006
[2.77] [2.61] [2.75] [2.86] [2.86]
Deal Size 0.07 0.07 -0.02
[0.59] [0.58] [-0.10]
Completion Time -30.21 -30.06 -38.61
[-0.29] [-0.29] [-0.35]
Diversify 607.52 623.26 496.30
[1.34] [1.36] [1.33]
Deal Result 202.72 215.35 114.66
[1.81] [1.90] [1.04]
CAR[−1, 1] -3.06 -3.62 -14.57
[-0.54] [-0.63] [-1.76]
Offer Price Revision 266.06 270.53 246.77
[1.21] [1.22] [1.16]
ROAt 24.03 209.57 142.12
[0.18] [1.50] [0.99]
TSRt 68.48 49.52 -11.26
[0.78] [0.58] [-0.13]
CEO Chair -101.47 -264.91
[-0.67] [-1.34]
CEO Nominating -356.19 -401.55
[-1.48] [-1.64]
Insider Ratio 653.54 605.85
[1.06] [1.17]
Board Size 115.23 95.56
[2.11] [1.56]
Include fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(Industry & Year)
Adjusted R2 11.70% 9.16% 10.96% 14.68% 14.35%
Total observations 204 204 204 204 204
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Table 6: Regression of CEO bonus against firm performance, managerial effort, skill and power
- Tobit regression
This table presents the results of a tobit regression of CEO bonuses against firm performance, managerial effort, skill and
power. The sample includes all ASX-listed firms in the Boardroom Connect4 database that have financial information
over the years 2000 through 2007. Bonuses are in thousands of dollars and size is in millions of dollars (same measure as
Gristein and Hribar (2004)). Each regression uses White heteroskedasticity consistent covariance estimates. It also includes
industry-specific and year-specific fixed effects to control for systematic differences in bonuses across industries and over
time. Size is the book value of total assets one financial year prior to the merger; Deal Size is the dollar value of the deal;
Completion Time is the log of the number of days between the date of deal announcement and the date of completion;
Diversify is a binary variable coded as one if the 2-digit GICS industry codes of acquirer and target firms are different,
and zero otherwise; Deal Result is a binary variable coded as one if the deal is completed and zero otherwise; CAR[-1,1]
indicates the market adjusted returns (against the All Ordinaries Index) over the windows centred on the announcement
day; ROA is earnings before tax divided by the book value of total assets; Offer Price Revision is a binary variable coded
as one if the bidder revises the price offered to the target; Return is the log of stock returns of acquiring firms one financial
year before the merger; CEO Chair is a binary variable coded as one if the CEO is also the chairman of the board; CEO
Nominating is a binary variable coded as one if the CEO is on the nominating committee; Board Size is the number of
members on the Board of Directors; Insider Ratio is the percentage of executive directors on the Board. Figures in bracket
are z-statistics. Emboldened figures indicate statistical significance of 10% level or better.
Dependent variable: Bonus ($’000) - Tobit regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sizet−1 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.006
[2.84] [2.62] [2.85] [2.92] [2.83]
Deal Size 0.15 0.15 -0.04
[1.10] [1.15] [-0.21]
Completion Time -66.42 -86.79 -168.32
[-0.33] [-0.45] [-0.79]
Diversify 467.18 700.12 498.15
[0.91] [1.19] [1.05]
Deal Result 421.75 670.13 449.18
[1.69] [2.37] [1.78]
CAR[−1, 1] -21.49 -23.79 -54.96
[-1.47] [-1.61] [-2.20]
Offer Price Revision 379.13 417.96 435.19
[1.22] [1.33] [1.47]
ROAt 2,699.50 3,566.92 3,399.52
[3.14] [2.84] [2.95]
TSRt 288.87 265.74 98.62
[1.33] [1.17] [0.50]
CEO Chair -791.31 -1,209.34
[-1.59] [-2.09]
CEO Nominating -542.12 -692.68
[-1.62] [-1.89]
Insider Ratio 417.25 553.71
[0.51] [0.70]
Board Size 209.41 197.70
[2.34] [1.96]
Include fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(Industry & Year)
No. of zero observations 85 85 85 85 85
No. of non-zero observations 119 119 119 119 119
Total observations 204 204 204 204 204
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Table 7: Regression of CEO compensation against firm performance, managerial
effort, skill and power
This table presents the results of an OLS regression of CEO compensation against firm performance, managerial effort, skill
and power. The sample includes all ASX-listed firms in the Boardroom Connect4 database that have financial information
over the years 2000 through 2007. For $’000 regressions, compensation figures are in thousands of dollars, deal size and
size are in millions of dollars (same measure as Gristein and Hribar (2004)). For Log regressions, compensation, size and
deal size are all expressed in the natural logarithm. Each regression uses White heteroskedasticity consistent covariance
estimates. It also includes industry-specific and year-specific fixed effects to control for systematic differences in bonuses
across industries and over time. Size is the book value of total assets one financial year prior to the merger; Deal Size is
the dollar value of the deal; Completion Time is the log of the number of days between the date of deal announcement
and the date of completion; Diversify is a binary variable coded as one if the 2-digit GICS industry codes of acquirer and
target firms are different, and zero otherwise; Deal Result is a binary variable coded as one if the deal is completed and zero
otherwise; CAR[-1,1] indicates the market adjusted returns (against the All Ordinaries Index) over the windows centred
on the announcement day; ROA is earnings before tax divided by the book value of total assets; Offer Price Revision is
a binary variable coded as one if the bidder revises the price offered to the target; Return is the log of stock returns of
acquiring firms in the financial year before the merger; CEO Chair is a binary variable coded as one if the CEO is also the
chairman of the board; CEO Nominating is a binary variable coded one as if the CEO is on the nominating committee;
Board Size is the number of members on the Board of Directors; Insider Ratio is the percentage of executive directors on
the Board. Figures in bracket are t-statistics. Emboldened figures indicate statistical significance of 10% level or better.
OLS regression
Salary Salary & Bonus Total compensation
$’000 Log $’000 Log $’000 Log
Sizet−1 0.001 0.21 0.007 0.30 0.02 0.31
[1.66] [9.31] [2.95] [11.49] [5.32] [11.54]
Deal Size 0.17 0.07 0.15 0.02 0.16 0.03
[3.36] [2.64] [0.82] [0.68] [0.60] [0.99]
Completion Time 1.48 0.02 -37.13 0.006 23.43 0.09
[0.02] [0.37] [-0.27] [0.08] [0.12] [1.16]
Diversify -47.22 -0.14 449.09 -0.07 1,162.86 0.14
[-0.49] [-1.54] [1.17] [-0.59] [2.14] [1.14]
Deal Result 36.93 0.001 151.59 0.04 88.33 0.04
[0.42] [0.006] [1.01] [0.49] [0.41] [0.36]
CAR[−1, 1] 1.58 0.004 -12.99 -0.003 -3.57 0.001
[0.40] [0.92] [-1.29] [-0.57] [-0.24] [0.1]
Offer Price Revision 147.49 0.11 394.26 0.19 700.77 0.22
[2.12] [1.51] [1.74] [2.26] [2.19] [2.26]
ROAt 291.09 0.08 433.21 0.18 577.18 0.19
[3.46] [0.53] [2.48] [1.10] [2.14] [1.05]
TSRt -23.24 0.04 -34.49 0.05 130.26 0.18
[-0.40] [0.60] [-0.28] [0.78] [0.78] [2.39]
CEO Chair -93.24 -0.13 -358.15 -0.20 -364.71 -0.05
[-0.90] [-0.91] [-1.59] [-1.24] [-1.13] [-0.3]
CEO Nominating 1.78 0.06 -399.73 -0.05 -816.82 -0.17
[0.02] [0.83] [-1.46] [-0.57] [-2.06] [-1.63]
Insider Ratio -165.84 0.03 440.01 0.17 743.04 0.11
[-0.64] [0.11] [0.73] [0.52] [0.90] [0.32]
Board Size 78.03 0.03 173.59 0.04 240.98 0.05
[2.91] [1.61] [2.58] [1.83] [2.62] [1.84]
Include fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(Industry & Year)
Adjusted R2 36.89% 67.75% 25.17% 70.00% 34.41% 70.24%
Total observations 204 204 204 204 204 204
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